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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 23/01/2008 Accident number: 502 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 12/11/2006 
Where it occurred: Task # 0007, Chaegari 
Village, Khulm District, 
Balkh Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 26/11/2006 
ID original source: OPS/01/01/04-out/437 Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 23/01/2008 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: E0674155.1  Map north: N 363808.1 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate survey (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
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squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text 
in [ ] is editorial. 
 
Cover letter 
File: OPS 01/01/04/out/437/06 
To: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
From: Area Manager UNA North and North East 
Date: Nov/26/ 2006 
Sub: Demining Accident Investigation Report of [National demining agency], Sur-No.10  
Attached please find the demining accident report of [National demining agency] Survey 
Team No.10, which was happened on 12/Nov/ 2006 at Cheitgari village Kholm District of 
Balkh province. 
Forwarded for your information and kind consideration. 
 
IMSMA Demining Investigation Report 
Date of incident/accident: 12/11/2006, 11:00 Hrs am. 
Location: E 067 42 02 N 36 37 58.6, GPS. Coordinates of Accident point E0674155.1 N 
363808.1. Mine Field Code #: AF/1614/32219/0007. GPS Accuracy: GARMIN, 14 Feet at the 
time of fixing the coordinates of the accident point. 
History of the Minefield: MF.007 is located at Chetgari village, Khulam district of Balkh 
province where currently the technical survey by [National demining agency] Survey team 
no.10 is on going. 
Task no.007 started by [National demining agency] Sur.T-10 on 24-Sep-06 and it is ongoing 
(92%) but unfortunately on 12-11-2006 at 11:00am demining accident happened on [Victim 
No.1] Surveyor of [National demining agency] Sur. Team no. 10, while he was busy on 
excavation in the boundary lane. Generally Land type of the contaminated area is Grazing in 
accordance with the LIS information the mentioned community is accounted as high impact, 
including three suspected hazard areas (SHAs). This is a self Propelled (weedy) land for a 
kind of Vegetable using for medicine that is exported from Afghanistan to India ... which is 
accounted as a main income beneficiary for the inhabitants housed around. The MF location 
is 40-50 Minutes foot distance far from the community top of the hills. Based on the LISA 
information, the land has contaminated by AP, PMN and POMZ type mines during 1983-1986 
by Russian and their Mercenary government, using [mines] as defence tools for protection of 
their Posts that are placed for the Security of Kabul —Mazar highway. This contamination has 
caused for 40 mine victims, resulted 17 killed and 23 injured, in addition of one Demining 
accident that occurred on [Another national demining group] deminer in the boundary lane of 
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task no.001 on Tuesday 10th May 2005 in SHA 01. Initially the task no.007 is a portion area 
of SHA-01 which has share boundary lane with Cleared task no.001. 
Device was detonated by Surveyor. Apparently, the accident has occurred in the boundary 
lane during excavation. Device that caused the incident/accident AP PMN. 
According to the information of team leader and contaminated area back round detonated 
mine was PMN but we couldn't see any part of the PMN mine.  
Device was detonated while the surveyor of team no.10 was busy on excavation in the 
boundary lane, which had 25-30 degrees slope and he excavated from top to bottom contour 
direction. 
Description of the incident/accident: According to the statements of respective Team 
leader, which was confirmed by all members of the team, at 11:00 hrs, [Victim No.1] blasted 
by anti personnel PMN mine during excavation on signal detected through him along the 
boundary lane between TP- 13 to T P- 12 of task no.007 located Chetgari village, Khulam 
district of Balkh province, while he was protected fully by PPE but his visor was not 
maintained to cover his face during his operation on point when the prodder struck with mine 
and accident happened. 
[Victim No.1’s visor: fragment strikes are visible on the forehead rim of the plastic helmet.] 
 
When the accident occurred on [Victim No.1], the second Surveyor [Name removed] 
controlled his operation 25m away from TP-13, third Surveyor [Name removed] and team 
leader [Name removed] were 48m away close to TP-14. The team leader was busy to task 
[Name removed] third surveyor to carry out stones for boundary lane [when] suddenly [the] 
accident occurred. 
Also [Victim N.2] surveyor of the mentioned survey team slipped down due nervous and as 
the resulted stepped out his ankle of right leg [dislocated his ankle]. 
After five minutes the Paramedic reached himself and after determining of first aid the victims 
are evacuated to the hospital.  
Casualties 
[Victim No.1] Surveyor: Activity: Prodding. 
[Victim No.2] Surveyor: Activity: Collection of stone [for area marking]. 
[Victim No.1] Injury 
1- Serious injuries in both eyes 
2- Both hands slightly injured. 
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3- One or two fragments in abdomen. 
4- Face was slightly injured.  
5- Both legs were slightly injured.   
 
[Victim No.2] Injury: Relocated his right foot ankle 
Description of equipment damage:  Inside of the visor got fragments. PPE got fragments. 
Peak of the prodder damaged.  
Site conditions: The terrain was described as “top of hill”. The soil was described as 
“medium”. The weather was clear and 17C. There was no vegetation. 
[The picture below shows the accident site. The indentations in the foreground are 
excavations made using a “shovel”.] 
 
Team and task details: Last QA inspections: External: 08-11-2006; Internal: 06/11/2006 
Field Supervisor [National demining agency]. The Team had been at the site for 22 days. 
Working hours were 07:00 – 13:00. The detector in use was the Ciea Mil-D1. [The Victims 
had returned] from mission leave on 29-10-06. The [PPE] vest was used properly as there 
wasn't any sign of injuries on the chest of victim. But the Helmet was not used properly and 
the visor was up as the fragments stuck from inside of the visor and his eyes and face got 
injuries. [There were abdomen injuries.] First CASEVAC drill on [site was conducted] 11--10-
06 second CASEVAC drill on 01/11/06 
Medical reaction time: The paramedic was at the accident site within five minutes. He treated 
the casualty for five minutes. The Victims were then driven 64 km to hospital in 45 minutes. 
Total CASEVAC time: 55 minutes. 
For the first time the victim has evacuated to Jordan Hospital in Mazar Airport and the spent a 
good deal of attention to the issue as the Jordan hospital was not complied with the eyes 
ward so the victim was advised to visit the eyes doctor or hospital for further treatment; when 
the necessary aid was administrated to him. After discussion with eyes doctor he advised to 
hospitalize him either in Mazar or Kabul. As the facility in Kabul hospital is more [better 
equipped] than Mazar so the victim was evacuated Kabul. 
 
Conclusions 
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As the accident investigation [was] conducted on the second day of this accident when the 
point was on his nature sight also the accomplished interview with the witness and team 
member assist to reach the following conclusion. 
The main factor of the accident was clearance of boundary lane from up to down position 
because the boundary lane had 25-30 degree slope and the surveyor continued clearance 
operation from top to bottom direction when the deminer can not control himself during 
prodding and pressure come on mine through prodder, also this system is not acceptable in 
manual clearance procedure. 
It is concluded that the victim was using the [folding] shovel instead of bayonet, based on the 
following factors: 
1. The signs of using the [folding] shovel clearly seen over the portion of lane checked 
along the day. 
2. As the [past] experience shows, when the accident happened on deminer during the 
prodding with bayonet, he almost [always] receiving amputation on his one hand's 
one or two fingers, but case is opposite in this accident as both hands of the victim 
received slight and round about same injuries without breaking of his finger bones or 
amputation because the shovel is used by both hands. Moreover, according to 
medical report, both hands of the victim Surveyor had hurts laceration in backsides of 
the hands, 
3. From the general view stricken fragments [of fragment strikes from] due to this 
explosion show that the victim was in bowing position and operating on signal by 
shovel as the fragments almost covered all his front side of body but not seriously 
injured him due the distance more than normal between him and the main point of 
accident. 
4. When it was asked from team to show the shovel they made excuse for presence of 
that tool. 
The task management of team leader to select the correct direction for team do make 
boundary lane in accordance to the standard of operation was poor and was not match 
considered to that issue. 
The victim's Visor was up during the excavation which is caused to receive some injuries in 
his face and specially eyes. 
About the damaging of bayonet, it cannot be proved if it is affected in direct stricken [was 
caused by a direct strike] with mine. 
 
Recommendations 
The operation with current direction (up to down) is to stop immediately and change the 
direction as per the requirement of SOP, that was physically advised to the team leader. 
Internal QA monitoring for [National demining agency] team No.10 is done very few in the 
mentioned task; as internal QA is very useful for operations of the teams, so it is 
recommended to the [National demining agency] site office to increase the internal QA as 
much as possible to proper monitor about implementation of procedure through team. 
As this accident has also happen due to neglect of victim by using the shovel up hold visor 
during excavation and operating on mine so, the team's command group is strongly 
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recommended to be aware of their staff and keep eye-contact and control each single activity 
performed through deminers /surveyors. 
Refresher course [was] conducted on 30-Oct-2006 in [National demining agency] site office 
Mazar-e-Sharif but unfortunately the victim surveyor was on leave and missed the refreshing 
course. So it is recommended that team leader or site supervisor is to pass the massage of 
the refresher course materials. In the case of any practical training, it should take place at the 
site of operation. 
Team leader is to split out the daily action plan and discuss with the team members to find the 
solution if there is any constraint against SOP implementation so refer it to consultation and 
advice of site supervisor. 
Attachments: [Held on file.] 
 
Follow-up letter 
File: OPS/03/01-26 
Date: December 19, 2006 
To: See distribution list 
From: Acting Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul 
Subject: Follow up action on demining accident happened to the surveyor of [National 
demining agency] Sur-10 in task # 0007 of Chaegari village, Khulm district of Balkh province 
Reference: Demining investigation report File: OPS/01/01/04-out/437-06 dated: November 
26, 2006, of UN-AMAC Mazar. 
A demining accident happened on November 12, 2006, at 11:00 in task # 0007 of Chetgari 
village, Khulm district of Balkh province, a PMN mine exploded on [Victim No.1] the surveyor 
of Sur-10 of [National demining agency], causing serious injuries to his both eyes and slight 
injuries to his hands, abdomen, face and legs. And a second surveyor [Victim No.2] was also 
involved and his right ankle joint was dislocated. 
Contributor factors to the accident: 
1. Poor management of the task/poor supervision: as the survey team was conducting 
the clearance of boundary lane around a minefield located on a hillside and the 
clearance lane (boundary lane) was selected from up to down direction (poor 
management of the task), and also the visor was kept up by victim surveyor (his eyes 
were seriously injured) and as seems from the cleared/excavated ground behind the 
accident point, it is assumed that the folding shovel had been used for excavation of 
signals, but in both cases he was not controlled and corrected by his team leader 
(poor supervision). 
2. Lack of training: excavating signals from up to down direction and use of not 
approved tool for the excavation and keeping up the visor show that the team needs 
re-training. Although the team was trained on 30th of October 2006 (one day 
refresher training) but the victim surveyor was on leave in mentioned date, and as per 
the investigation report, the fault was not made only by victim, but the second 
surveyor for his control and the team leader were also included. 
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3. Carelessness/not using proper tools: the surveyor was not using approved 
prodding/excavating tool and kept his visor up indicating his carelessness in dealing 
with mine clearance activities. 
Recommendations: 
The operation/supervisors of [National demining agency] should ensure that a proper 
management of the task and approved tools have been using for the clearance of boundary 
lanes around and cross lanes in the minefields. 
The command group of the team should pay full attention to the activities carried out by each 
individual surveyor/deminer during the clearance operations and ensure the a) proper 
practicing of safety measures, b) proper demining tools are being used and c) practicing 
standard and safe procedures according to SOPs. 
Team leader should brief the daily action/operation plan to the team members and seek their 
opinion to find solution if faced any constraint against SOP implementation and refer to advice 
of supervisor if needed. 
A refresher training to be held for the team members with focus on task management, 
operation in areas with slope and excavation/prodding drills. 
Disciplinary action to be taken against command group of the team. 
The feedback of [National demining agency] is needed as NL than the end of December 
2006.  
Distribution List 
With attachment: AMACs (5), Sub AMAC Gardez, Director [National demining agency] 
Less attachment: [All demining groups working in country.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 662 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 30 Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Three hours, thirty 
minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Visor 
worn raised 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Abdomen 
minor Hands 
minor Legs 
severe Face 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes  
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COMMENT: See Medical report. 
Medical report 
IMSMA record gives DoB: 1976 
First hospital reached: 2:30 (14:30) 
“Serious injury both eyes (loss) and a surface injury can be seen on his face, legs and 
stomach by fragments.” 
[The picture below, showing field treatment, was included with the report.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 663 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Three hours, thirty 
minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Not recorded 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Foot 
COMMENT:"The explosion of mine affected to [Victim no.2]. He afraid and fell down and 
relocate the bone of his right foot." No Medical report was made available. 
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STATEMENTS 
Statement and Witness Report 1: Team leader 
Date: 13/11/2006 
Q1: When the casualty occurred, where was your location? 
A1: When the casualty occurred, I was 48m away from victim surveyor. I tasked Surveyor 
number three to collect stone for boundary lane at this moment accident occurred. 
Q2: What was the reason of Accident on [Victim No.1] surveyor of team 10? 
I don't know the reason of accident, but the area was suitable for prodding. You closely visited 
the area. It was the mistake of victim surveyor by himself.  
Q3: Dear team leader of team 10, who was blaming in that accident? 
A3: As I described above that wasn't any problem in the field for clearance therefore the 
victim surveyor was blamed because he know all regulation of the demining. In the time of 
accident he used PPE and Helmet. 
Q4: Dear Team leader of team 10, please write detail of the Accident? 
A4: On 11:00AM occurred on [Victim No.1] surveyor of team no.10 when he was searching to 
find a target by prodder. All members of the team were in their location. After accident 
stopped operation and area cleared for relocation of the victim then relocated victim to 
cleared area and first aid done by paramedic. After first aid relocated to Admin area then 
relocated to Jurdun Hospital Mazar-e-Sharif Airport. 
Q5: For the prevent of this kind of mine accident, what should be done? 
A5: If all tools, which are we have and we must careful use accordingly possible to stop that 
kind of accident. 
Q6: As you mentioned that the victim surveyor used PPE and helmet that why his eyes 
injured please explain it? 
A6: If he didn't use PPE why his more part of the body didn't injured. All parts of his body 
didn't get injury with out his face, possible at this moment his visor be not down. 
Q7: At the time of accident [Victim No.1] was in which style please explain it? Or at the time of 
accident what did [Victim No.1] do? 
A7: When I asked from controller of the victim he told me the mentioned victim was sitting in 
kneeling style, when he tried to relocate soil he was in semi kneeling mode and accident 
happened. 
 
Statement and Witness Report 2: Field supervisor 
Date:13/11/2006 
Q1: Please explain that who is blamed in this mine accident? 
A1: As we visited place of accident and heard statements of team leader [Name removed] 
surveyor of team 10, due to his personal careless during prodding accident happened on him. 
His face and eyes had hurts these hurts shown that his visor wasn't down. Command and 
control of the team leader is so good he is very active person. Demining operation is very 
dangerous therefore it is required to do demining operation with completely Patience and 
according to SOP of the agency to stop that kind of Casualty. 
9 
 Statement and Witness Report 3: Assistant team leader 
Date: 13/11/2006 
Q1: Please write Detail of the accident?  
A1: I was 25m away from [Victim No.1] victim surveyor. Before him, I was busy on boundary 
clearance operation. When my time finished, I given him all information regarding my work 
then he start activity. So I was 25m away and busy to control his operation and the accident 
happened.  
Q2: Where was your location while accident occurred on [Victim No.1] ? 
A2: I was 25m away from him and busy to control his operation. 
Q3: You were 25m away from [Victim No.1] and controlled his operation. What was his 
negative act that the accident happened? 
A3: [Victim No.1] was busy on prodding that the accident happened. I couldn't see his 
negative act during prodding just his visor was not down. I told him your visor is not correct. In 
this time he stand and accident occurred. 
Q4: It is clearly looking form the accident point the demining operation done from up to down. 
Did you inform your Team leader or Supervisor that work from up to down is not according 
demining SOP? 
A4: We watched that the field didn't have a lot of slope so we done operation from here from 
up to down. And the supervisor visited us few days a go, he told us you should follow the new 
procedure of [National demining agency] but unfortunately to implement this procedure and at 
the result accident occurred. 
Q5: What should do be done to stop this kind of accident? 
A5: The area, which is very high like that, first should take advantage from Helicopter. If no 
chance of Helicopter, needs to provide Horse or donkey to reach the field easily and work on 
cool and normal mind. It very difficult that surveyors relocate all survey equipments to the top 
of hill and work as well. 
 
Analysis 
Victim No.1 suffered injuries to the abdomen, which may imply that his body armour was not 
worn, or not worn correctly. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
investigators found that the clearance plan for the task was in breach of SOPs, the Victim was 
working downhill and using the wrong tools, and was not wearing his PPE correctly. Not only 
were these errors not corrected, the field supervisors attempted to mislead the investigators 
about the tool in use at the time. The investigators identified a contributory cause to be 
inadequate training, which is a management responsibility. The demining group’s senior 
management are responsible for the appointment and training of their field controllers, so the 
secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy”.  
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